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The Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus Review: Rose v. Mitchell I-James E.
Mitchell and James Nichols, Jr. were indicted in two counts of first degree
murder by the grand jury of Tipton County, Tennessee. 2 Before trial, re-
spondents, both black, filed a plea in abatement with the Tipton County Cir-
cuit Court.3 They sought dismissal of the indictments on the ground that the
grand jury array and foreman had been selected in a racially discriminatory
manner.4 After hearing evidence on this question,5 the judge denied the plea
without comment.
6
Respondents were tried in the Circuit Court of Tipton County before a
jury and were convicted on each count of first degree murder. 7 They ap-
pealed their convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals where
they again attacked the selection process of the grand jury and foreman.8 In
a unanimous decision,9 the court affirmed the convictions and held that re-
spondents had failed to establish a systematic exclusion of blacks from grand
jury service.10 The Supreme Court of Tennessee denied certiorari.1 1
Respondents sought habeas corpus relief 12 in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee, renewing their claim of dis-
1 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
2 Id. at 547. The grand jury was composed of twelve jurors, including one
black woman. Because the regular grand jury foreman was unavailable, the trial judge
appointed an acting foreman. Twenty witnesses were scheduled to testify before the
grand jury. However, the grand jury unanimously voted to indict after hearing the
testimony of one police officer. This witness did not mention respondents' race and
this fact was not known to the grand jury or foreman at the time of the indictment.
The acting foreman did not vote on the indictment because of the unanimity of the
grand jurors, but did sign the indictment as required by TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1706
(1975). Appendix at 3-35 (1979).
1 Id. at 548. This pre-trial motion was filed pro se. Id. Counsel was appointed
by the county circuit court to represent respondents at the evidentiary hearing on the
motion. Id. at 549.
4 Id. at 549.
The evidence consisted of the testimony on behalf of the respondents, of'
three Tipton County jury commissioners, two former grand jury foremen, the current
foreman, and eleven of the twelve members of the grand jury which indicted respon-
dents. On behalf of the State, testimony was received from the circuit court clerk of
Tipton County. Id. at 549.
6 Id. After hearing respondents' evidence, the trial judge stated that "the
plea in abatement will be denied." Appendix at 35. This ruling iwas not accompanied
by any written or oral findings of law or fact. The judge subsequently entered a writ-
ten order which stated in full "the plea in abatement is overruled." Appendix at 36.
7 443 U.S. at 549. The evidence at trial consisted of five eyewitnesses who
identified respondents as the murderers. A confession by Mitchell was also introduced
along with proof that respondents had been in possession of the murder weapons and
property stolen from the scene of the crime. The defense relied primarily on the
testimonial denial by Nichols of any participation in the murders. Appendix at 38.
s 443 U.S. at 549.
Appendix at 39.
10 443 U.S. at 549.
IId.
12 As referred to in this note, federal habeas corpus enables a state prisoner
to request a federal district court to review the state proceeding which resulted in his
conviction on the grounds that he is held in custody in violation of the federal Con-
stitution or laws. The federal court's review is collateral in nature. 28 U.S.C. §§ 224 1-
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crimination in the selection of the grand jury and its foreman. 13 The case
was referred to a magistrate who reviewed respondent's claim in light of the
evidence introduced at the state court hearing on the plea in abatement. 4
The magistrate concluded that respondents had presented an unrebutted
prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury fore-
man El and recommended that the district court conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing on the selection of both the grand jury and its foreman. 16 Upon consid-
ering the issue, the district court agreed with the county circuit court's finding
that the grand jury had been properly selected, but decided that respondents
had shown a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of the foreman
and therefore ordered the State to submit evidence on this issue.17
In response, the state offered two affidavits-one from the acting fore-
man, stating inter alia that he had not voted on the indictments of respon-
dents,'" and another from the judge who appointed the foreman, denying
any racial grounds for the appointment. " On the basis of these affidavits,
the district court dismissed the petitions for habeas corpus.2" Respondents
requested the court to reconsider its ruling,2 1 but the court refused, stating
that in addition to its original reasons for the dismissal, habeas relief was un-
available because collateral attack on state court convictions was precluded by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell.22 Respondents
2254. See text at note 57 infra. A similar post-conviction remedy is available to a pris-
oner held in federal custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Though this parallels habeas
corpus review, it is technically not referred to as such. See, e.g., Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
13 443 U.S. at 549. Respondents filed separate petitions for habeas review and
the cases were consolidated in the district court. Id. at 549; Appendix at 83.
14 443 U.S. at 549. Tennessee uses the "key man" system of grand jury selec-
tion whereby three jury commissioners are appointed by the trial judge to select a pool
of prospective grand jurors from the general population. Id. at 548 n.2. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 22-223-228 (Supp. 1979). The commissioners meet every two years to select
names "from the tax records and permanent registration records of the county or
other available and reliable sources." A list of names of "upright and intelligent per-
sons known for their integrity, fair character and sound judgment" are recorded in a
jury list book and selected at random for both grand and petit jurors. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 22-228. A grand jury consists of twelve grand jurors. TENN. R. CRIM. P. 6
(1979).
A grand jury foreman is selected from the general population and appointed for
a two-year term by the trial judge. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1506 (Supp. 1978). There is
no limitation on reappointment. Id. The foreman serves as the "thirteenth" member of
the grand jury. Id. at § 40-1501.
':, 443 U.S. at 549-50.
16 Id. at 549.
17 Id. at 550.
18 Appendix at 105.
"' Appendix at 113.
2" 443 U.S. at 550.
21 Appendix at 124.
22 Appendix at 125. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Stone Court
held that where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim, federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable.
Id. at 494. For a discussion of Stone, see text at notes 21-27.
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appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.23 This court reversed
the district court after finding discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury foreman.2 4 The case was remanded to the Circuit Court of Tipton
County with instructions to set aside the convictions and to either reindict
respondents within sixty days or release them.
25
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 6 to decide whether
a state prisoner may advance a claim of racial discrimination in the appoint-
ment of a grand jury foreman in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 27 Re-
versing the court of appeals in a plurality decision, the Court HELD: Racial
discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury foreman, 28 if proved, is a
valid ground for setting aside a state conviction and quashing an indictment, 29
and may be raised on federal habeas corpus review. 30 The Court found,
however, as a matter of law, that respondents failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination with regard to the selection of the grand jury fore-
man.31 Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions.3 2
The significance of Rose lies in the Court's refusal to apply the rule of
Stone v. Powell33 to foreclose habeas corpus review of a claim of grand jury
discrimination. Stone denied habeas relief to claimants who asserted that evi-
dence was introduced at trial contrary to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
such claim.3 4 Although Stone only concerned habeas review of exclusionary
rule claims, this decision was thought to signal more general restrictions on
the scope of habeas corpus relief.35 In Rose, the Court declined to impose
such restrictions and thereby reaffirmed its pre-Stone approach to habeas, an
approach favoring an expansive scope for habeas review. Stone is thus con-
fined to a narrow fourth amendment exception to an otherwise broad scope
of review for habeas corpus petitions.
This casenote will examine the expansion of habeas corpus review which
the Supreme Court effectively announced in Rose v. Mitchell. To accomplish
this, the Court's reasoning in Rose will first be examined in detail. Second, the
casenote will trace the development of federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions and analyze the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell as it was under-
23 443 U.S. at 550. This appeal was possible because the district judge granted
the certificate of probable cause required by FED. R. App. P. 22 (b). Id.
24 Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 135 (1978).
25 Id. at 137.
26 439 U.S. 816 (1978).
27 443 U.S. at 550-51.
28 The Court also characterized the claim before it as racial discrimination in
the selection of members of a grand jury. Id. at 556. Because a finding of racial dis-
crimination in the selection of a nonvoting foreman is sufficient to set aside the ver-
dict, it is assumed that a similar finding with respect to a voting grand juror would also
require the conviction to be set aside. See discussion at note 48 infra.
29 443 U.S. at 559.
30 Id. at 564.
31 Id. at 574.
32 Id.
33 428 U.S. 465.
34 Id. at 494.
35 See note 110 infra.
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stood before Rose. Finally, the impact of Rose on Stone will be scrutinized. It
will be suggested that the Rose decision clarifies the Court's approach to fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state claims by considering and explaining the
proper interpretation of Stone v. Powell.
I. THE ROSE DECISION: THE
RAMIFICATIONS OF STONE REJECTED
In Rose a plurality of the Court concluded that a claim of grand jury
discrimination is cognizable on habeas corpus review, 36 but that respondents
had failed to establish such discrimination.3 7 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun first considered whether "a federal court, as a matter of policy,
should hear claims of racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury
when reviewing a state conviction." 38 He analyzed the problem in two steps:
1) whether discrimination in the selection of a grand jury or foreman is a
valid basis for setting aside a criminal conviction and 2) whether such claims
are cognizable on habeas corpus review in light of Stone v. Powell.39
In addressing the first issue, Justice Blackmun reviewed a long line of
decisions, beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia.40 Strauder and its prog-
eny,41 the Court noted, consistently held that the conviction of a black defen-
dant cannot stand when based on an indictment by a grand jury selected in a
manner inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 42 In Alexander v. Louisiana,43 for example, the Court noted that
a criminal defendant "is entitled to require that the State not deliberately and
31' 443 U. S. at 559.
37 Id. at 574. In Rose, seven justices voted to uphold respondents' convictions.
They were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, Powell, Stewart, and
Chief Justice Burger. Of these seven, four disagreed with Justice Blackmun's treatment
of the habeas issue. Id. at 547. Justices Powell and Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
concurred in the judgment of the court, but found it unnecessary to reach the merits
of petitioners' claim on habeas corpus. Id. at 574-88. See text at notes 65-67 infra.
Although Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the judgment without joining in Jus-
tice Blackmun's resolution of the habeas question, he did not file a separate opinion,
nor did he join in the aforementioned concurring opinions. Id. at 547.
Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from the judgment to affirm
the convictions on the basis that respondents had established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in the appointment of the grand jury foreman. Id. at 588-93. See
text at note 70 infra. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens explained his agreement
with the court on the habeas corpus issue on the basis of stare decisis. Id. at 593-94.
Both concurred with Justice Blackmun's analysis of the proper scope of habeas review.
Therefore, although Rose was a 7-2 decision to uphold the convictions, it was a 5-4
decision to grant habeas review of respondents' claim.
38 Id. at 550.
31 Id. at 550-51.
40 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
41 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110
(1883); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). See also Rose, "443 U.S. at 550 n.3.
42 443 U.S. at 551.
43 Id., quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628 (1972).
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systematically deny to members of his race the right to participate as jurors in
the administration of justice."4' The Rose Court reasoned that to set aside a
conviction where the right to jury participation has been violated is to protect
not only the rights of the accused, but to redress the injury caused by such a
violation to the administration of justice and to society as a whole. 45  The
Court stressed the need to protect the integrity of the judicial process from
the taint of racial discrimination and concluded that to permit "challenges to
unconstitutional state action by defendants has been and is, the main avenue
by which Fourteenth Amendment rights are vindicated in this context."'"'
Having found that discrimination in the selection of a grand jury consti-
tutes a valid ground for setting aside a criminal conviction, the Court next
considered whether its decision in Stone v. Powell should preclude habeas re-
view of such a claim. In Stone, the Court held that habeas relief is generally
unavailable to a state prisoner who claims that under the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule 4 7 evidence was improperly admitted at trial. An exception
exists, however, where "the state prisoner was denied an 'opportunity for a
full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review." 48 The Rose
Court noted that Stone was based on a finding that the exclusionary rule's
purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct was not furthered by habeas
review of a conviction obtained in a state court and upheld on direct re-
view. 49  Additionally, collateral review of exclusionary rule claims would
neither advance an awareness of the values protected by the fourth amend-
ment5" nor be likely to "reveal flaws in the search or seizure that had gone
undetected at trial or on appeal."' The Rose Court stated that because of
these factors, habeas review of fourth amendment claims in Stone was fore-
closed.
By contrast, however, the Rose Court stated that habeas review of a claim
of grand jury discrimination may reveal constitutional errors undetected in
the state forum.52 The Court reasoned that "state judges [are] perhaps too
close to the day-to-day operation of their system to be able properly to
evaluate claims that the system is defective." 53 Collateral review also would
achieve an "educative and deterrent effect" because a federal finding of un-
constitutionality of the operation of a state's grand jury system would lead to a
change in that system. 54
44 Id. at 628-29.
45 443 U.S. at 556, quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
46 Id. at 558.
47 The exclusionary rule provides for the suppression of evidence obtained
through a violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights where suppression
would deter future unlawful police conduct. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
48 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1976); quoted in Rose, 443 U.S. at 560.
49 Id. at 562.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 563.
53 Id.
5 Id. The Court stated "[t]he educative and deterrent effects of federal re-
view is likely to be great, since the state officials who operate the system, judges or
employees of the judiciary, may be expected to take note of a federal court's determi-
nation that their procedures are unconstitutional and must be changed." Id.
[Vol. 21:948
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In addition to these factors, the Court recognized that its decision in
Stone was based in part on its impression that state courts could adequately
adjudicate fourth amendment claims and that additional litigation in federal
courts would be largely repetitive.5" The state trial court in Rose, however,
was itself the target of respondents' claim. Because "the very judge whose
conduct respondents challenged decided the validity of that challenge,"56 the
Court concluded that habeas corpus relief was required to provide respon-
dents with a full and fair consideration of their claim.5 7 It thereby limited
Stone's restriction of habeas review to fourth amendment exclusionary rule
claims.
Having found that claims of grand jury discrimination are cognizable on
habeas corpus, the Court next considered whether respondents had estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury
foreman. The Court found that respondents' evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law, to support an inference that the disparity between the number
of blacks serving as foreman and the black population in the county was the
result of racial discrimination.5 8 Since respondents did not sustain their bur-
den of proof they were not entitled to habeas relief and their convictions were
upheld."'
Four justices did not join in Justice Blackmun's resolution of the habeas
issue.'" Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, found it unnecessary to
decide the merits of respondents' claim. He maintained that an indictment,
returned by a grand jury that had been selected in a discriminatory manner,
does not impugn the fairness of the trial which resulted in the convictions
since a properly selected petit jury had to be convinced of respondents' guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Respondents had not challenged the fairness
of their trial, but rather, the constitutionality of the pre-trial selection of a
grand jury.6 2 Justice Stewart also noted the availability of alternative rem-
edies for eradicating discrimination in this context.6 3 He concluded that dis-
Id.
, Id.
, Id.
' Id. at 565. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection
,,f a grand jury foreman, respondents were required to show the degree of underrep-
resentation of blacks" 'by comparing the proportion of the group in the total popula-
tion to the proportion called to serve as foreman over a significant period of time.' "
Id. qutwing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Respondents relied solely on
the testimony of two former and the current foreman of the Tipton County grand
jury to attempt to prove underrepresentation. Each foreman testified that he had no
knowledge of any black person ever serving as foreman. Respondents did not show
that the foremen were knowledgable about any years other than the ones in which
the) served. There was no other evidence relating to the years during which the fore-
man did not serve. Additionally, respondents made no direct assertion that no black
had ever served for a long period of time, as foreman of the Tipton County grand
jury. Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 574.
, See note 28 supra.
' Id. at 574-77.
d2 Id.
13 Id. at 578-79. Justice Stewart referred to: 1) the ability of the class discrimi-
nated against to obtain injunctive relief; 2) the remedy provided by 18 U.S.C. § 243
May 19801
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crimination in the selection of a grand jury or its foreman is not a sufficient
ground for setting aside a conviction on either direct or habeas review. 64
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, also concurred in the judgment of
the Court, but would not have granted habeas review of the merits of respon-
dents' claim.65  He reasoned that respondents received a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate their claim in the state courts and thus were not entitled to
collateral review.6 6 As defined by Justice Powell, the writ of habeas corpus is
meant to protect the innocent from unjust convictions and should not be
employed merely to promote the general societal goal of grand jury integrity
or to combat racial discrimination.67
Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed that proof of grand jury
discrinination is a valid basis for setting aside a conviction. 8  He also con-
curred with Justice Blackmun's discussion regarding the scope of habeas re-
view.69 Justice White dissented, however, on the ground that respondents
had established a prima facie case of 'discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury foreman.7 0  He therefore would have overturned the convictions.
Thus, a majority of the Court, comprised of Justices Blackmun, White,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, concluded that a state prisoner's claim of
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman is cognizable on
federal habeas corpus review. They also agreed that an unrebutted prima
facie case of such discrimination requires that the indictment be quashed and
the conviction set aside. These justices, however, differed as to whether an
unrebutted prima facie case had been established. Consequently, only Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall voted to affirm the conviction. The re-
maining four, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger, would have affirmed without reaching the merits of the case on
habeas review.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE CONVICTIONS
Federal habeas corpus 7 1 is available by way of a statutory grant of juris-
diction which authorizes a federal court to scrutinize both federal and state
(1976) which makes it a criminal offense for a public official to exclude any person
from a grand or petit jury for reasons based on race; 3) a defendant's "pre-trial rem-
edies against unlawful, indictments." Id.
64 Id. at 579.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 586-87.
68 Id. at 588.
;!) Id.
70 Id. Justice White reasoned that a showing of a statistical disparity between
the number of blacks serving as foreman and the black population in the county may
be inappropriate where "the focus of inquiry is a single officeholder whose term lasts
two full years .. " Id. at 591. Rather, the testimony of the three Tipton County fore-
men and the fact that the selection of a foreman is left to the complete discretion of
the county judge was, in Justice White's opinion, sufficient to raise an inference of
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 592-93.
71 For an exhaustive account of federal habeas corpus review, see Bator, Fi-
nality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator].
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court convictions.7 2 Thus, a prisoner who claims that he is held in violation
of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States is entitled to advance
these claims in a federal forum.7 3 Because habeas is not defined by statute
7 4
or the Constitution,7 5 the United States Supreme Court has been responsible
for delineating the scope of habeas corpus review.
7 6
Originally, habeas relief was available only to prisoners held in federal
custody,77 and was limited to a consideration of the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction. For example, in Ex parte Watkins,78 a federal prisoner sought
habeas review of his claim that his conviction was based on an indictment
which failed to state a federal crime.79  The Court refused to examine the
merits of this claim and held that a judgment by a court of competent juris-
diction may not be tested for error on habeas.8 0  In Ex parte Siebold,8 1 the
Court broadened the scope of habeas review without departing from the
jurisdictional test set forth in Watkins. In Siebold, a federal prisoner sought
habeas review, arguing that the statute creating the offense for which he was
convicted was unconstitutional.8 2 The Court held that habeas was available, 3
reasoning that "if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court
acquired no jurisdiction of the causes." 84 Re-emphasizing this jurisdictional
requirement, Justice Holmes stated in Matter of Moran 85 that a claim of a fifth
amendment violation at trial was not cognizable on habeas corpus because
even if there was error, "it did not go to the jurisdiction of the court." 
8 6
The nature of habeas corpus was altered once again by the Habeas Cor-
pus Act of 186787 which empowered federal courts to grant habeas relief to
72 Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1864, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1976). Section
2241 (a) (1976) states "writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions ... " Section 2255 provides for collateral review of federal convictions
and, technically, is not habeas corpus review. However, it provides for essentially the
same remedy as that provided by § 2254 for state prisoners and is thus commonly
referred to as habeas corpus.
73 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
74 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1976).
75 U.S. CoNsT. article I, § 9, cl. 2.
76 Ex Parte Stewart, 47 F. Supp. 415 (1942).
7 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 29, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
78 28 U.S. 200 (1830).
79 Id. at 200.
8 Id. at 202.
81 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
82 Id. at 374.
83 Id. at 376.
84 Id. at 377.
8 203 U.S. 96 (1906).
816 Id. at 105 (emphasis added). Although the Court, on habeas review, consis-
tently refused to reexamine substantive errors going to the conviction, it did consider
alleged illegality in sentencing. For example, in the case of In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274
(1887) the Court decided that where the indictment charged only one offense, the
imposition of consecutive sentences therefor was unconstitutional. Id. at 284-85. Ac-
cordingly, the habeas petitioner was released after serving the legal portion of the
sentence. See Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 10 (1876); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884).
87 Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 384, codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1976).
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state prisoners. The Act stated that federal courts "in addition to the authority
already conferred by law shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. .. ."I'l Al-
though the statute also prescribed the procedure to be followed on habeas, it
left the Court free to develop the substantive scope of habeas review of state
claims and to impose any other limitations not inconsistent with the Act.89
Due to concerns of comity and federalism, the Supreme Court developed the
doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies with regard to state prisoners seeking
federal habeas review. In Ex parte Royall,9" a state petitioner, awaiting trial,
sought habeas review of his claim that the statute under which he was charged
was unconstitutional." Although the issue was considered "jurisdictional"
and therefore cognizable on habeas review, the Court denied relief. It held
that as a matter of discretion, and in the absence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances, a federal court should not assert habeas jurisdiction before the
state trial court has decided the otherwise cognizable federal questions at is-
sue. 9 2 In subsequent cases, the Court determined that a state claimant must
also pursue state appellate and post-conviction procedures and petition for a
writ of error9 3 with the Supreme Court before seeking habeas review.9 4
With the exception of the exhaustion of state remedies requirement, the
substantive scope of habeas review was identical for both state and federal
prisoners. Accordingly, in the case of In re Wood,"5 the Court refused to grant
habeas review of a state prisoner's claim that he had been indicted by a grand
jury selected in a racially discriminatory manner.90  While it acknowledged
that such selection procedures would violate the Constitution, the Court
reasoned that the issue did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction."7  Thus, at
this stage in its development, habeas corpus was available to examine the
jurisdiction of a state or federal court, including the constitutionality of a stat-
ute.
88 Id.
89 Id. See also Bator, supra note 71, at 474-77.
1( 117 U.S. 241 (1836).
" Id. at 245.
92 Id. at 253.
:,3 The function of the Writ of Error is to bring a judgment of an inferior
court before a higher court with appellate jurisdiction for purpose of review on ques-
tions of law. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.14 (1975).
94 See, e.g., Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (1886); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449
(1891) (failure to exhaust state appellate procedures); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100
(1894) (failure to exhaust state post-conviction remedies); In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70
(1893) (failure to seek writ of error in the U.S. Supreme Court). The exhaustion of
state remedies requirement is not inflexible, yielding always to exceptional cir-
cumstances. For instance, see Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963). The Court in Fay allowed, as a matter of limited discretion,
habeas review of a state prisoner's claim that his conviction was based on a coerced
confession, where the claimant had not exhausted state remedies because his co-
defendants had successfully appealed to reverse similar convictions. Id. at 438.
:' 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
"' Id. at 289.
1,7 Id. at 285-86.
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This interpretation of the scope of habeas corpus remained fundamen-
tally unchanged until 1915, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Frank v. Mlangum.98 Frank was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. He petitioned for a
new trial, claiming that his trial had been dominated by a mob which biased
the judge and jury. The petition was denied and Frank appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Georgia.99 That Court made an extensive inquiry into the
matter before finding that Frank had received a fair trial. 10 After pursuing
state post-conviction procedures 101 and petitioning unsuccessfully for a writ of
error by the United States Supreme Court,'0 2 Frank sought habeas relief in
the federal district court. The district court denied habeas review 103 and the
Supreme Court affirmed.'
The Court stated that if a mob were to intimidate a judge and jury so as
to actually interfere with the course of justice, the result would be "a depar-
ture from due process of law." 10" Whether a mob did in fact interfere with
the trial, however, was a question that could be adequately and finally adjudi-
cated by the state appellate courts.'06 The Court therefore determined that a
full and fair litigation of federal questions through state appellate review was
sufficient to satisfy the "due process" requirement.' Although it denied re-
lief, the Court expanded the scope of habeas review by holding that where an
opportunity for adequate appellate or "corrective" process is not provided to
the claimant, a court on habeas could inquire into the merits of a claim,
whether or not the claim was "jurisdictional" in nature. 0 8 Thus, the Frank
Court broadened the scope of habeas review by making it available to both
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims as long as such claims had not pre-
viously been fully and fairly litigated in the state forum.
There was no further change in the scope of habeas review until the
Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen.' 0 9 Brown was convicted of
rape and sentenced to death by a North Carolina court. He appealed his con-
viction, to the state supreme court, claiming it was based on the admission of
a coerced confession prohibited by the fifth amendment. He also claimed ra-
237 U.S. 309 (1915).
Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 280, 80 S.E. 1016, 1034 (1914).
, Id.
101 The trial court denied a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence and this action was affirmed by the state supreme court, Frank v.
State, 83 S.E. 233 (Ga. 1914). Frank next filed a motion with the superior court to set
aside the verdict, claiming inter alia that his absence from the courtroom when the
verdict was rendered was involuntary, and that this vitiated the result. The State inter-
posed a demurrer which the superior court sustained. Once again, the state supreme
court affirmed, 83 S.E. 645 (Ga. 1914).
111 In the Matter of Frank, 235 U.S. 694 (1914).
1"' The opinion of the district court is unreported. See 237 U.S. at 311.
237 U.S. at 345 (1915).
10- Id. at 335.
l Id.
'o Id. at 335-37.
o Id. at 327.
,, 344 U. S. 443 (1953).
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cial discrimination in the selection of grand and petit juries prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment. These claims were fully litigated in the trial court and
again in the state supreme court which affirmed the conviction."' Certiorari
was denied "I and Brown sought federal habeas corpus.1 12 The district court
denied habeas review without a hearing" 3 and the court of appeals af-
firmed. 14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari " and affirmed the convic-
tion.' 1 6 The Court did not rely on Frank v. Mangum, 11 7 to avoid reaching the
merits on habeas by finding that the state had provided adequate corrective
process. Rather, the Court examined the merits of Brown's claims which had
been fully litigated in the state courts.' 1 8 In so doing, the Court abandoned
the Frank limitation that habeas would not be available to review claims which
had already been adequately litigated. The Brown Court, however, did not
discuss its reason for expanding the scope of review beyond the bounds set
forth in Frank. Eight of the nine justices seemed to assume sub silentio that
federal courts have the power to review the merits of constitutional claims
previously adjudicated in the state forum." ' The Court also indicated that a
district court judge could, as a matter of discretion, disregard the state's find-
ing of facts regardless of the adequacy of such findings. 12" Thus, without
explaining why, the Court made habeas review available to all claims regard-
less of the adequacy of prior proceedings and left the district court free to
make its own fact findings. The Court's rationale for the Brown decision re-
mained unarticulated in subsequent decisions, as the Court continued to rely
on its assumption that habeas relief is available to a state prisoner notwith-
standing a full and fair litigation of federal questions by the state courts.'
2
'
Although Brown was criticized, 122 it remained intact until Stone v. Powell.
110 State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E.2d 99 (1951).
"' 341 U.S. 943 (1951).
112 98 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.C. 1951).
113 Id.
114 192 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1951).
"1 343 U.S. 903 (1952).
116 344 U.S. at 487.
-" 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
118 344 U.S. at 465-87.
"I See J. Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Brown, 344 U.S. at 497-512. See
also Bator, supra note 71, at 500-07.
120 344 U.S. at 463-64, 478.
121 See e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States ex rel. Jennings
v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276 (1959); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
122 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683-85 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Harlan characterized Brown as an "unsound extension
of the historic scope of the writ and an unfortunate display of insensitivity to the
principles of federalism which underlie the American legal system." Id. at 685. See also
Bator supra note 71, at 499-528. Bator characterizes the Brown decision as "unrespon-
sive to (and even subversive of) what should be our central aim: encouraging reform
and improvement in state criminal procedures." Id. at 525.
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III. THE RATIONALE OF STONE V. POWELL
In Stone v. Powell,'23 a state prisoner sought federal habeas corpus review
of his claim that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was
improperly introduced at trial.' 2 4 The issue was whether fourth amendment
claims are cognizable on habeas corpus review.'12 The Court held that where
the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a claim
under the fourth amendment, the Constitution does not require that it be
reviewed by a federal court on petition for habeas review. 126
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell characterized the exclusionary
rule as a "judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment," 127 rather than a personal constitutional right.' 2 8 Ap-
plication of the rule in this context results in the suppression of evidence
obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure.' 29 Traditionally, the
exclusion of such evidence was thought to preserve the integrity of the judi-
cial process as well as to deter unlawful police conduct.130 Noting that ille-
gally obtained evidence can be used both in grand jury proceedings and to
impeach the defendant, Justice Powell reasoned that judicial integrity was not
in itself sufficient to justify the "exclusion of highly probative evidence." 131
Therefore, the Court maintained that the primary rationale behind the
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and thus assure protection of
individual privacy and security in society.' 32
Having defined the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule, the
Court next considered whether a prisoner, who has been afforded the oppor-
tunity of full and fair litigation of his claim in the state courts, may obtain
federal habeas corpus review.' 3  To make this determination, the Court
weighed "the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it
to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims." 131 It observed that
habeas review of such claims would not augment the protections afforded by
the fourth amendment or reveal flaws in the search and seizure not discov-
ered by the state courts. 135 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
exclusionary rule's aim of deterring unlawful police conduct would not be
123 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
124 Id. at 468-69. See note 47 supra (explanation of the exclusionary rule).
125 Id. at 469.
126 Id. at 481-82.
127 Id. at 482.
128 Id. at 486.
129 See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). The exclusionary rule was held constitutionally
binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
130 See note 47 supra, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-24 (1960),
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
131 428 U.S. at 485.
132 Id. at 486.
,31 Id. at 489.
134 Id.
13" Id. at 493.
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advanced significantly by reviewing such claims on habeas corpus where a full
and fair state adjudication had been available. 136
On its face, Stone appears to be a relatively straightforward decision. To
reach its conclusion, the Court merely balanced the costs of granting habeas
review of exclusionary rule claims against the concurrent benefits to be de-
rived 137 if such review were granted. The Court, however, made several
comments in footnotes which would indicate that the rationale of Stone was
not intended to apply solely to fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims,
but rather to other constitutional claims raised by habeas petitioners as well.138
Moreover, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Stone, accused the Court of setting
forth a spurious rationale for its decision. He said
the real ground of today's decision-a ground that is particularly
troubling in light of its portent for habeas jurisdiction generally-is
the Court's novel reinterpretation of the habeas statutes .... 13
Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a construction of the
haabeas statutes to deny relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional
violations, based on this Court's vague notions of comity and
federalism, is the actual premise for today's decision, and although
the Court attempts to bury its underlying premises in footnotes, those
premises mark this case as a harbinger of future eviscerations of the
habeas statutes that plainly does violence to congressional power to
frame the statutory contours of habeas jurisdictions.140
Justice Brennan's observation was not undeserved. The Court's remarks gen-
erated some confusion I41 which may have prompted the Court's discussion of
the scope of habeas review in Rose v. Mitchell. Theiefore, a close examination
of these comments in Stone is essential to an understanding of both Stone and
Rose.
In a footnote to its opinion, the Stone Court stated that because the writ
of habeas corpus is equitable in nature, the Court has discretion in deciding
whether to issue it.1 42 It noted too, that "[riesort to habeas corpus, especially
for purposes other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an uncon-
stitutional loss of liberty, results in intrusion on values important to our sys-
tem of government." 143 These values include "'(i) the most effective utiliza-
136 Id. at 493-94.
137 Id. at 489-96.
138 See 428 U.S. at 478 n.ll, 483, n.19, 491, nn.30, 31, 34.
131. Id. at 515.
141 Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
141 See Robbins and Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance of Justice, and the
Great Vrit of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 A i.
CRIM. L. REV. 63 (1977); Kelley, Preferred Rights and Strict Scrutiny in the Law of Habeas
Corpus, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 754 (1978); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and
the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978); Comment, The "Opportunity" Test of
Stone v. Powell: Toward a Redefinition of Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 VILL. L. REv. 1095
(1978).
"2 428 U.S. at 478 n. 11. The Court quoted its statement in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 438 (1961) that "'[d]iscretion is implicit'" in the requirement of 28 U.S.C. §
2243 that the judge "'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' " Id.
143 Id. at 491 n.31.
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tion of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials,
(iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of jus-
tice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the
doctrine of federation is founded."' 144 In the Court's view, the cost of in-
fringing these values incurred upon habeas review of exclusionary rule claims
are not outweighed by the benefits of such review. Furthering the underlying
purpose of the fourth amendment is simply more important. 45 Therefore,
because these values would be jeopardized by habeas review of exclusionary
rule claims, habeas would no longer be available in this context. Moreover, the
Court implied that should these values be infringed in circumstances not in-
volving the fourth amendment, a judge would have the discretion to foreclose
habeas review. 146
In addition to the protection of these values, the Court set forth another
reason militating against habeas review of exclusionary rule claims. The Court
described habeas corpus as "an additional safeguard against compelling an
innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." 147 As such,
habeas review need not be available to redress fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule claims since "in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, as-
serted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to
redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarcera-
tion." 148 The Court implied that where a state prisoner has been found
guilty, a federal court on habeas has the discretion to deny review of those
claims not related to the determination of guilt or innocence. This in turn
suggests that to raise such a claim, the habeas petitioner must assert a colora-
ble claim of innocence or at least assert actual prejudice constituting error in
the fact-finding process.' 49
Although this approach to habeas corpus has been advocated by some
legal scholars, 150 the Court's apparent limiting of habeas corpus review to the
trial's fact-finding process marked a departure from its pre-Stone position.
Habeas review had previously been understood as enabling a federal court to
examine the overall legality of the prisoner's detention. including all pro-
cedural and substantive requirements of due process. 15 1 Thus, the Court in
Stone seemed to narrow its prior perception of habeas by confining collateral
review to claims concerning the trial's determination of facts.
'41 Id. at 491 n.31, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259
(1973) (Powvell, J., concurring).
', 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
146 Id.
147 Id.
141 Id. By "basic justice", the Court meant the issue of whether an innocent man
would "suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty." Id. Thus, a guilty person's fourth
amendment claim would not implicate the "basic justice of his incarceration" since
"basic justice" entails the incarceration of guilty persons.
'4 Id. at 478 n.l 1, 483, n.19, 491 n.30, quoting Oaks, Ethics, Morality and Professional
Responsibility, 1975 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 591, 596 & n.31.
'a" See, e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970), and Bator, supra note 71.
'," See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
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Another source of confusion in Stone was the Court's apparent overruling
of Brown v. Allen. 1. 2  In Brown, the Court held that a state prisoner could
obtain federal habeas corpus review of his federal claims regardless of the
adequacy of the State's adjudication of such claims. 15 3 The Brown Court thus
broadened the scope of habeas review by abandoning the Frank v. Magnum
requirement that habeas be available only where the state's "corrective proc-
ess" was inadequate. It has been suggested that the expansion of habeas re-
view in Brown was the product of the Court's dissatisfaction with the state
courts' treatment of federal constitutional issues. 15 4  By holding that a full
and fair opportunity to litigate an exclusionary rule claim in the state courts
would preclude federal habeas relief, the Stone Court exhibited a willingness
to return to its pre-Brown position with regard to the scope of review. The
Court's emphasis on the adequacy of state proceedings echoed its holding in
Frank v. Magnum 135 restricting habeas to those claims not fully and fairly ad-
judicated in the state forum.'56 That a state court could resolve a federal
claim competently and with finality is reflected in the Stone Court's refusal to
"assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to con-
stitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States ....
[T]here is no 'intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge
should make him more competant or conscientous or learned ... than his
neighbor in the state courthouse.' "157 In sum, a broad reading of Stone re-
veals that two major changes in the scope of federal habeas corpus review
appeared to be effected. First, claims unrelated to the determination of guilt
seemed no longer cognizable on habeas review. Second, where a claim other-
wise cognizable on habeas had been fully and fairly adjudicated by a state
tribunal, it would not be reexamined by a federal court."3 s
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF STONE
That Stone was intended to be read broadly to restrict the scope of fed-
eral habeas review of claims other than those involving the fourth amendment
was evidenced by references to Stone in subsequent Supreme Court cases. Jus-
tice Brennan, who dissented vehemently in Stone, continued his attack on that
decision in Juidice v. Vail. 159 Dissenting in Vail, Justice Brennan maintained
that Stone was more than just the product of the Court's dissatisfaction with
the exclusionary rule.160 Rather, in his view, Stone "so circumscribed the
centuries-old remedy of habeas corpus as to weaken drastically the federal
courts' ability to safeguard individuals from unconstitutional imprison-
152 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See text at notes 84-94.
153 Id.
154 Bator, supra note 71.
155 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See text at notes 77-83.
156 237 U.S. at 327.
157 428 U.S. at 493 n.35, quoting Bator, supra, note 71 at 509.
ID8 The Court's language is unclear as to whether these changes are manda-
tory. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n. 11. At a minimum, it seemed to provide for a federal
court's discretionary refusal to issue the writ under such circumstances. Id.
159 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
160 Id. at 346.
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ment." 161 At a glance, this remark might be understood as flowing from
Justice Brennan's perception of the exclusionary rule as intrinsic to the fourth
amendment, and thus a matter of constitutional magnitude rather than
merely a judicially created remedy. He went on to say, however, that Stone, as
one of several decisions "rendered in the name of federalism" 162 and
grounded in "vague, undefined notions of equity, comity and federalism," 163
exemplifies the Court's effort to limit the protective role of the federal
judiciary by entrusting the state courts with the protection of individual
rights.1 6 4 These comments suggest that Justice Brennan anticipated that the
Court would continue to foreclose habeas review of non-fourth amendment
claims which were not related to the fact-finding process and which could be
adequately adjudicated in a state forum.
Justice Brennan's reading of Stone was supported by Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Brewer v. lVilliams.' 6 5 Referring to a defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel, and possibly to the fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination, 6 6 the Chief Justice stated that he would not allow a
defendant to collaterally attack his conviction unless the alleged constitutional
error related to the integrity of the fact-finding process and supported a col-
orable claim of innocence.1 67 Thus, he would not have reached the merits of
the case on habeas since petitioner's sixth amendment claim did not relate to
the question of guilt. Chief Justice Burger also expressed his dismay that Jus-
tice Powell, who wrote for the majority in Stone, joined in the Brewer majority's
habeas corpus review of the respondent's sixth amendment claim rather than
remand the case for reconsideration in light of Stone. 16 8  Clearly, the Chief
Justice, like Justice Brennan, understood Stone as not just an exclusionary rule
case, but as portending further limitations on the scope of federal habeas
corpus review.
Justice Powell's refusal to seek reconsideration of Brewer in light of
Stone may be explained by reference to his comments in Stone. There, Justice
Powell stated that, unlike a fourth amendment violation, a fifth or sixth
amendment violation might impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process
so as to be cognizable on habeas review.'6 9 Therefore, Justice Powell's posi-
tion in Brewer did not signal a departure from his reasoning in Stone. Rather,
131 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. In addition to Stone, Justice Brennan cited Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976) (with regard to habeas corpus); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);
and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (with
regard to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
164 430 U.S. 327, 346.
16, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
16 Respondent in Brewer claimed that his fifth and sixth amendment rights
had been violated. However, the Court concluded that it only needed to consider the
sixth amendment issue. Id. at 397-98. The majority did not consider whether fifth or
sixth amendment claims might not be cognizable on habeas.
167 Id. at 428-29, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240-42
(1969) (Black, J. dissenting).
168 Id. at 428.
1;9 428 U.S. at 479.
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he differed from Chief Justice Burger only with regard to the effect of a fifth
or sixth amendment violation on the integrity of the fact-finding process. Jus-
tice Powell's adherence to Stone is further evidenced by his remarks in Cas-
taneda v. Partida,'7 0 decided on the same day as Brewer.'7 ' In Castaneda, the
respondent was convicted of a crime in a state court and claimed on habeas
review that the grand jury that indicted him had been selected in a dis-
criminatory manner. Respondent, a Mexican-American, based this claim on
the gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the county grand
juries. 72 The Court held that respondent had offered sufficient proof to
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination which the State had
failed to rebut. 73 Dissenting on the ground that the evidence did not sup-
port a prima facie case of discrimination, 7 4 Justice Powell commented that
[a] strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination
are not cognizable on habeas corpus review after Stone v. Powell ....
[T]he prisoner in this case challenges only the now moot determina-
tion by the grand jury that there was sufficient cause to proceed to
trial. He points to no flaw in the trial itself.'
75
This issue was not addressed by the Court since it was not argued by coun-
sel.17 6 Yet, Justice Powell did indicate that, given the opportunity, he would
exclude claims of discrimination in grand juror selection from the scope of
habeas review where the claim had been fully and fairly litigated in the state
courts.17 7  It was this same view that he advanced in his concurring opinion
in Rose v. Mitchell.17
8
Thus, prior to Rose, there was some uncertainty among the members of
the Court as to how the scope of habeas review of state claims had been
altered. Several Justices interpreted Stone as precluding habeas review of state
claims unrelated to the issue of guilt and the trial's determination of fact.
Others saw that decision as pertaining solely to habeas review of fourth
amendment exclusionary rule claims. Rose, then, was a chance for the court to
clarify its position as to the proper scope of state claims.
V. THE IMPACT OF ROSE
ON STONE V. POWELL
Rose v. Mitchell presented the Court with an opportunity to further limit
the availability of habeas review. The only claim in Rose was whether racial
170 430 U.S. 428, 507-18 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
171 Castaneda and Brewer were decided on March 23, 1977.
172 430 U.S. at 485-92.
173 Id. at 492-501.
174 Id. at 507-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 508 n.1.
,71 "But as this issue was not addressed below and was not briefed or argued in
this Court, it would be inappropriate to resolve it in this case." Id.
177 Id. The aforementioned interpretations of Stone were not the only indi-
cators of further changes in the scope of federal habeas corpus review. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court in Rose, stated that Justice Powell's opinion in Cas-
taneda was supported by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and, perhaps inferen-
tially, Justice Stewart. 443 U.S. at 559.
178 443 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., concurring). See text at note 65 supra.
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discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman who did not vote on
the indictment was cognizable on habeas corpus review. This claim in no way
related to the integrity of the trial court's fact-finding process, nor was there
any showing of a colorable claim of innocence or actual prejudice to respon-
dents. Moreover, the claim of discrimination had been adjudicated on state
appellate review. Accordingly, to follow Stone, an alleged fourteenth amend-
ment violation in the selection of the foreman should not have been cogniza-
ble on federal habeas review where the claim had been adequately litigated in
the state forum. Nonetheless, the Rose Court refused to apply the Stone rule
and restrict the scope of habeas review of state court convictions. Although
Stone was not overturned, the Rose majority narrowly construed that decision,
leaving it in effect as only a very limited exception to an otherwise broad
scope of heabeas review.
The Rose Court first attempted to distinguish Stone by describing the
exclusionary rule as a "judicially created" remedy rather than a constitutional
right under the fourth amendment. 179 The Court reaffirmed its finding in
Stone that the benefits of applying this rule on habeas review are outweighed
by the attendant costs of doing so, 18 0 but only insofar as that finding was
based on a judicial remedy theory. Accordingly, with regard to constitutional
claims rather than judicially created devices, habeas would continue to be av-
ailable. The Court observed that "a claim of discrimination differs so funda-
mentally from application on habeas of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule that the reasoning of Stone v. Powell should not be extended to foreclose
habeas review of such claims in federal court." 181
In addition to limiting Stone to a non-constitutional, judicially created
remedy, the Rose Court mentioned two other "fundamental differences be-
tween the claim here at issue and the claim at issue in Stone v. Powell." 182 In
the case of a fourth amendment violation, the trial court is asked to determine
whether the police acted illegally, and, if so, whether the suppression of evi-
dence obtained as a result of such conduct would deter similar behavior in the
future.1 3 In Rose the trial court was in the peculiar position of having to
determine whether the means of grand jury selection, in which it had partici-
pated, was constitutional. Thus, while the integrity of the judiciary was not
challenged with regard to fourth amendment claims at issue in Stone, the state
trial court itself was the focus of the challenge in Rose, bringing "the integrity
of the judicial system into direct question." 184
I7" /d.at 560, 562.
18o Id. at 562-63.
181 Id. at 560-61. For purposes of habeas review, the Rose Court's differentia-
tion between the exclusionary rule as a judicial remedy and the fourth amendment as
a constitutional right is unsound. Regardless of how the Court characterizes the
exclusionary rule, its refusal to allow collateral review of such claims precludes a
habeas petitioner from obtaining relief for a fourth amendment violation. Indeed, the
Court itself has referred to Stone as "'removing from the purview of a federal habeas
court challenges resting on the Fourth Amendment, where there has been a full and fair
opportunity to raise them in the state court." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-80
(1977) (emphasis added).
I, 443 U.S. at 561.
183 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
184 443 U.S. at 563.
May 1980]
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The Rose Court also concentrated on the type and degree of harm that
results from a fourteenth amendment violation as opposed to a fourth
amendment violation or a misapplication of the exclusionary rule.183 In the
latter case, the harm is to the individual against whom illegally obtained evi-
dence is admitted. In the context of the fourteenth amendment, the harm is
not only to the individual, but also to society as a whole. "The exclusion from
grand jury service of Negroes, or any group otherwise qualified to serve," the
Court stated, "impairs the confidence of the public in the administration ofjustice." ""G
Of these two aspects mentioned by the Rose Court, the more curious
statement is the observation that the trial court was incapable of resolving a
claim of grand jury discrimination due to its own involvement in the selection
process. The Court concluded that since the trial court was thus unable to
resolve the issue, "[a] federal forum must be available if a full and fair hear-
ing of such claims is to be had." 187 This language might be interpreted to
indicate the Court's adherence to Stone's apparent restriction of federal review
to those claims not adequately litigated in the state forum. In Rose, however,
absolutely no mention is made of state appellate review of challenges to a trial
court's conduct. The Court does not state whether the involvement of the trial
court in a fourteenth amendment violation so taints the entirety of a state's
judicial process as to render the state court of appeals incapable of resolving
such a claim. Thus, by failing to address the adequacy of state appellate or
corrective process, the Court suggests a return to the expansive scope of fed-
eral habeas review set forth in Brown. 1 88  Under Brown, any constitutional
claim was cognizable on habeas regardless of the adequacy of a state's correc-
tive process.' 8 9
As a third and final reason for distinguishing Stone from Rose the Court
emphasized that habeas is available not only to protect the rights of the indi-
vidual but also to advance more general societal goals, such as the preserva-
185 Id. at 564.
186 Id. at 556.
187 Id. at 561.
188 Id. 344 U.S. 443. See text at notes 84-94 supra.
819 See text at note 84 infra. That the Court is not willing to entrust the state
courts with the final resolution of other constitutional claims is indicated not only in
Rose, but in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 323 (1979) where the Court states:
The federal habeas corpus statute presumes the norm of a fair trial in
the state court and adequate state post-conviction remedies to redress pos-
sible error. What it does not presume is that these state proceedings will
always be without error in the constitutional sense. The duty of a federal
habeas corpus court to appraise a claim that constitutional error did
occur-reflecting as it does the belief that the 'finality' of a deprivation of
liberty through the invocation of the criminal sanction is simply not to be
achieved at the expense of a constitutional right-is not one that can be so
lightly abjured.
Id. This statement, read in conjunction with Rose, makes it clear that habeas corpus
remains available to litigate all constitutional claims, and is foreclosed only with regard
to non-constitutional fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims.
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tion of judicial integrity and the denigration of racial discrimination,' 90 the
Court observed:
ITihe constitutional interests that a federal court adjudicating a claim
on habeas of grand jury discrimination seeks to vindicate are sub-
stantially more compelling than those at issue in Stone ... discrimina-
tion on account of race in the administration of justice strikes at the
core concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment and at fundamental
values of our society and our legal system. Where discrimination that
is "at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a rep-
resentative government".., infects the legal system, the strong in-
terest in making available federal habeas corpus relief outweighs the
costs associated with such relief. 91
By distinguishing Stone on this basis, the Court implies that societal goals of
similar import would not be advanced by habeas review of fourth amendment
exclusionary rule claims where the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the matter in the state forum. By allowing habeas to be used as a
vehicle to further societal goals, the Court has taken a giant step away from
the "basic justice" defined in terms of the individual in Stone 192 and dem-
onstrated its willingness to make habeas available at great cost.
CONCLUSION
Prior to Rose, a broad reading of Stone indicated that the Court appeared
to have made two major changes in the scope of federal habeas corpus review
of state claims, both of which would initiate a retreat from Brown. The first
change was the requirement that, to be cognizable on habeas, the claim must
be related to the trial's fact-finding process. The second required that other-
wise cognizable claims would not be reviewed if fully and fairly litigated by
the state trial and appellate courts. In Rose, the Court clearly stated that it did
not intend to restrict habeas review to trial-related claims as had been
suggested by Stone. This, coupled with the Court's limitation of the adequate
state process requirement to exclusionary rule claims evidences a revitalization
of Brown's expansive scope of habeas review.' 93
It would appear that the outcome of each case is the product of the
Court's definition of the purposes of habeas corpus review. While Stone sig-
nalled a narrowing in the definition, Rose heralded a renewal of the broad
scope of review announced in Brown over twenty years ago. Traditionally,
consistency in this area of the law has been elusive. Almost ten years ago,
Justice Harlan stated that:
present habeas corpus decisions provide little assistance in fathoming
the underlying understanding of habeas corpus upon which these
decisions have been premised. The short of the matter is that this
,,11 443 U.S. at 563-64.
19, Id. at 564.
192 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976). See note 116 supra.
193 See text & note at note 110 supra.
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Court has in recent times yet to produce any considered, coherent
statement of the general purposes of habeas.19 4
By effectively reversing much of Stone and reaffirming Brown, the Court has
taken a beginning step towards developing a "considered" and "coherent" ap-
proach to habeas corpus. It is unlikely that the Court again will restrict the
scope of habeas review as it did in Stone after refusing in Rose to exclude from
the purview of habeas a claim of discrimination in the selection of a non-
voting grand jury foreman, a claim which, if proved, would have had no im-
pact on the fairness of the trial and for which alternative remedies exist.
MARY ANN CHIRBA-MARTIN
194 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
